• It’s my great pleasure to be the host for another distinguished philosopher, Professor Simon Kirchin. Thank you so much for accepting my invitation to this session. Please receive our warmest welcome! Now, my first question would be what is meta-ethics?

We can study ethics in several ways. We might discuss everyday ethical topics, such as how humans should treat animals or the ethical codes of medical professionals. From many such discussions, we might think that there are general ethical rules or principles we can discern. We get normative ethical theories such as consequentialism (only the consequences of our actions have ethical significance) or deontology (what matters morally, instead, are the types of action, not the results). Meta-ethics is a different set of concerns and debates from these. When we discuss particular cases or debate ethical principles, we assume that there really is an ethical reality we are trying to discern or find. We think that actions, for example, can be ethically right and wrong, good and bad. In contrast, meta-ethics concerns itself with this assumption and related issues. There is a range of questions at the core of meta-ethics. Are our actions, people and institutions morally good and bad? If so, what exactly is the nature of such values? How are supposed ethical values connected to our everyday world? How can we find a place for values in a metaphysical conception of the world which is dominated by a scientific worldview? How can we be confident we are judging correctly? If ethical values do not exist, then what is going on with our language? (We use such value terms, such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’, all the time and seem as if we are describing the world. For example, we often say, “She is good”, “He is kind”, “That business is corrupt”.)  Although ‘meta-ethics’ is a commonly used term, these questions arise in many areas of value, such as aesthetics and politics, not just ethics.

• Thank you very much, professor. Could you please tell us what are the main questions and positions in meta-ethics? What are the challenges? What would it be for the world to have or not have value?

The main positions or stances of meta-ethics can be introduced in a variety of ways. I find that the easiest distinction to understand is between realists and non-realists.

Realists believe that there really are ethical value properties that it makes sense to say are part of the world. This idea can be captured in several ways. Perhaps the emphasis is on ontology: value properties really exist. Perhaps the emphasis is on language: certain statements that reference value property terms can be (properly) true or false. (As we will see, non-realists do not agree.)

The key questions then follow for realists. What exactly is the nature of these supposed value properties? I think the specific way of answering this question is to ask how much value properties are related to the rest of the world. One very influential variety of realism is naturalism. Naturalism can be defined in many ways, but broadly naturalists think that any property or feature is not of its own kind, metaphysically or conceptually apart, but it is part of the natural world of tables and chairs, intentions and feelings. Some naturalists, including ethical naturalists, give this stance a scientific twist and say that ethical properties can be accommodated within or wholly explained by a scientific worldview. There are a range of positions within this broad stance, with the choice often coming down to how ‘reductionist’ we wish to be: to what extent can we reduce or further explain the ethical phenomena in terms of other natural or scientific phenomena? There are a range of arguments for naturalism, but many stem from the idea that if we aren’t naturalists we are left with a strange view of what ethical value properties are. How could they connect with the rest of the world? How can they cause anything? After all, we often think that people’s ethical character causes them to act in certain ways. But if we don’t think of such ethical character traits along naturalistic lines, it isn’t obvious how that could happen.

This takes us to the other dominant family of realist views. Non-naturalists turn the idea of strangeness on its head. Ethical value properties are​ different from many other features and objects in the world, indeed, they are very different. Naturalism can’t be right because it doesn’t capture what is often referred to as the ‘normative’ dimension of ethical and other properties: the fact that if something is good or right it should be done. If we naturalize everything we are in danger of merely describing the world and not capturing how the world should or should not be. Non-naturalism about ethics says that ethical value properties are ultimately sui generis, that is ‘of their own kind’. Non-naturalism also comes in different varieties. One striking difference is whether non-naturalism can become a third, distinct type of position, namely ‘supernaturalism’, where what is ethical is caused by something supernatural and is the work of God or gods.

• Now we get to this, could you please let us know about the pros and cons -if any- of the idea of those believing that without divine command, there could not be any moral, and thus everything would be justifiable? – from your own perspective, please-.

That type of realism – often called Divine Command theory – is not much discussed by many meta-ethicists, but it is important to dwell on, I think. So the main idea is that moral values and reasons exist, but they exist because, in some way, God or a set of gods have created them. That phrasing itself raises many issues. For example, that phrasing suggests that the supernatural being or beings have authority over ethical matters and not the other way around. Assuming that can be accepted, we might then discuss what reason we have to believe in the existence of supernatural beings. It seems that according to this theory, unless their existence can be believed, then the existence of ethical values can be doubted. That is problematic, of course, as some people do not believe in supernatural entities capable of providing ethics with the authority required. However, some people who defend a Divine Command theory-type realism make the point that unless there is something else standing behind ethics and giving it authority, then ethics loses authority, and we will then have a world with no values at all. Such people point to the current world. There is so much disagreement about what is ethically right and wrong – often referred to as ‘Relativism’ – that we cannot hope to fashion a different sort of standard unless we believe supernatural beings are standing behind and authorizing our values. The idea continues that non-naturalist and naturalist versions of realism assert that ethical values are simply there. But without any further explanation, we may be doubtful of this brute fact, and we may worry about the alternative explanation of basing what is right and wrong only on people’s views because it is too open to difference and dispute. A sort of nihilism or anti-realism may loom. The world may have no value at all, and that is dangerous.   We, therefore, need the authority behind our ethics. But, as I have already said, this​ view is problematic as it requires belief in a supernatural entity or entities capable of providing ethics with the required authority.

So much for the main two branches of realism. What of non-realism? Again, two main families come to mind here. When thinking about them the importance of everyday language and ordinary conceptions of what we are doing when we think ethically comes to the fore. Error theorists agree with realists, particularly non-naturalists, that our everyday conception of value properties is that such things can and do exist and that they are metaphysically or conceptually quite different. But they think that no such things do, in fact, exist. (They often cite the idea that such value properties would be very strange indeed.)  Or, in other words, they think that the everyday ethical conception of the world is a massive error. Note that it is not just that our everyday ethical thoughts are somewhat wrong, with a few marginal mistakes. There is something rotten at the heart of the whole system: our whole system of morality is based on a conception of value which is confused and incoherent.

• What are the challenges of the Error Theory?

The challenge for error theorists, however, is to then say what comes in its place. This debate has become very involved in recent years. Some think that error theorists are committed to straightforward nihilism: this is, in effect, the idea that there is no value (or nothing worth the label). Not only are no actions good, kind or cowardly, but no art is beautiful or ugly, and no one is wise or foolish. Many see this as a very bleak view, as we saw above with Divine Command theory. Some error theorists adopt what they call ‘Fictionalism’: we can maintain ethical thought and language whilst knowing it is a useful fiction. No such position is entirely satisfactory, in my view. Ethical thought and language are so pervasive and deep-seated that it seems that it must be more than useful fiction or anything similar.

In contrast to error theory, another non-realist family of views is non-cognitivism. Very broadly, non-cognitivist also deny that there is an ethical reality, at least how ethical realists conceive of it. But, unlike error theorists, they do not convict ordinary moral thought and language of being fundamentally mistaken. Instead, they seek to show that something interesting is going on with how we think and speak ethically. It may *seem* as if we are asserting something about the world; that is, it seems as if we are trying to describe it when we say that charity-giving is good or kind, for example. However, non-cognitivist will say that we are doing something else in the use of such language; our words have a deeper function. Perhaps we are expressing an emotion, best encapsulated by saying something such as “Hooray for giving to charity!”. Perhaps we are giving instruction to others, “Give to charity!” or “Please give to charity!”. There are a number of other options. Whichever option we favour, the point is that our everyday ethical language is not an attempt, really, to describe the world. So we are not in error. But also, one of the main intuitions in favour of a realist position is undermined. Instead, we can live ethically, but we must realize that we create our moral world, not that it exists prior to our judgements and characters. This latter idea often gets attached to non-cognitivism.

Meta-ethics is a fascinating area. All these positions have their advantages and disadvantages, and there is plenty to be said about each family. What I have given here is only a quick summary of a lot of complicated material with a lot to take in. I hope it gives a good enough overview, though.

• Thank you very much, professor. The information was of value and I hope we could learn more on this topic in another session and learn more from you. Thank you for your time. Have a nice day.

[1] Director of Division of Arts and Humanities, Professor of Philosophy, University of Kent, UK.